Carney Bets Big on Copper, but Two Fast-Tracked Mines Won’t Make Us a Powerhouse

T wo of the first five major national projects recently advanced by the Mark Carney government for fast tracking involve copper mines. The remaining three involve increased liquefied natural gas production in Kitimat, British Columbia; the construction of a suite of small modular nuclear reactors at the Darlington facility in Ontario; and the expansion of a container port in Montreal.

The prioritizing of two copper mines probably took many people by surprise. Why copper mines? Why these ones?

Copper was one of six prioritized critical minerals in the previous government’s 2022 critical minerals strategy, alongside lithium, graphite, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements, or RREs. Copper’s elevated place in the critical minerals spectrum reflects its role in the green energy transformation, including for wiring in electricity and telecommunications networks and in electric vehicles, solar panels, and electronic components. It’s a hardy, non-corrosive metal, more easily mined than some others in the critical minerals pantheon (such as lithium and REEs).

The red metal’s future as a mineral commodity appears bright, or so must be the hope, even though its recent past was less shiny. Over the decade from 2014 to 2023, copper production in Canada declined by 22 percent. Production from Canadian mines in 2023 was slightly less than in 2022. Figures for 2024 showed another decline. The backing of two copper mine projects is clearly designed to reverse this long slide. Future federal government projections on the market value of copper show huge gains by 2040, outstripped in magnitude only by those forecast for lithium.

Let’s hope the predictions are right. They are certainly rosy, despite the track record of market fluctuations for copper. What seems clearer is that putting two copper mines front and centre ensures the government’s first wave of nation-building projects carries the right message: elbows up, but with lots of optics.

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I n a global context, Canada is a relative bit player in copper production. Chile is the world leader, producing, according to 2023 numbers, some 23 percent of global output, followed by its Southern Cone neighbour, Peru, at 12 percent, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo at 11 percent. Mine output from the DRC increased in 2024 to the extent that it outstripped that of Peru and climbed the rankings to the world’s second largest producer. The United States, ranked fifth in the world, produces about three times the copper that Canada does; Canada comes in twelfth, at 2 percent of global mined copper. Where Canada shines is in copper recycling, much of which takes place at facilities in Quebec.

When it comes to copper refining, China is hugely dominant, with 44 percent of the global share, followed by Chile and the DRC, each with 8 percent. Canada has one facility for smelting copper, in Rouyn-Noranda, Quebec, and one refinery that produces copper cathodes, in Montreal.

Against this backdrop, how do we make sense of the fast tracking of two copper mines? Let’s look at Foran Mining’s McIlvenna Bay copper mine in northeastern Saskatchewan. The mine is a start-up, not yet in production but scheduled to begin operations in 2026. In the “Backgrounder” document provided by the Major Projects Office, the mine is described as a source to “strengthen Canada’s position as a global supplier of critical minerals for clean energy, advanced manufacturing and modern infrastructure.”

But in reality, it will be difficult to move Canada up in the league tables. What the Foran mine represents is a project that shows strong Indigenous partnership, is located in a mineral-rich area (Hanson Lake region) with future potential, and could be a source for an enhanced critical minerals supply route via rail from nearby Flin Flon, Manitoba, to the port of Churchill, Manitoba, on Hudson’s Bay. Support for the mine links to an interest in expanding the port of Churchill to provide for export capacity in the North (strong, year-round export capacity would require the deployment of icebreakers), with potential links to trade routes to Europe.

The mine has another attractive feature—it’s Canadian owned. The Foran company is essentially a junior miner, but it has enjoyed some remarkable financing success in recent years, with shareholders including Canadian mining magnate Pierre Lassonde and Fairfax Holdings. Its share price has rocketed upward. The Canadian government pumped $41 million, through its Strategic Innovation Fund, into the mine in an announcement this past January.

Support for the mine is a bet on a Canadian company in the critical minerals field, a showcase for Indigenous partnership, an important gesture in support of resource development in Saskatchewan, and a harbinger of future thinking about a northern gateway for Canadian energy-resource exports. There is a lot of politics at play.

What about the other copper mine? This one, the Red Chris Mill mine, is in northern BC, near the Alaska border. This mine is no start-up; it’s been in operation for a decade and produces both copper and gold (gold is not considered a critical mineral). It’s an open-pit mine that initially faced opposition from local Indigenous communities but now operates with the full support of the Tahltan Nation, on whose land the mine sits.

The plan is to alter mining extraction at Red Chris Mill to allow for something called “block-cave mining,” which involves blasting rock from above into underground tunnels for extraction of the ore. According to the federal government’s announcement, once the new mining method is operational, it will extend the lifespan of the mine by a decade and up Canada’s annual copper production by 15 percent. While that sounds like a significant jump, it would not fundamentally change Canada’s place as a global producer. We would still be outside the top ten.

The Red Chris Mill bet looks more straightforward than the McIlvenna Bay one. Expansion, not start-up. A significant copper production boost, with full Indigenous partnership and the complete support of the BC government. (American ownership—Newmont, based in Colorado and known primarily as a gold miner—is not in the headlines.)

T he fast tracking of the two copper mine projects suggests there is a model in place that emphasizes restoring Canadian levels of mineral production, betting on future demand and price hikes, promoting Indigenous partnerships, trying to ensure good ESG (environmental, social, and governance) practices, supporting regional resource priorities, and looking to new economic and trade-route opportunities in the North. All sensible, so far as this goes.

The key question is whether, as claimed, these two projects will “strengthen Canada’s position as a global supplier of critical minerals.” The fast tracking of two mines will not change Canada’s relatively low global ranking in terms of copper extraction. It will not impact on China’s dominance of global copper refining. So strengthen how?

Where do current Canadian exports of copper go in the world? In 2023, 17 percent to China and 12 percent to Japan. South Korea was an important Canadian market for copper concentrates. However, 52 percent went to the US. The export dependency on the American market is striking and could face some very significant challenges in the form of, guess what, US tariffs.

A Trump Damocles sword already hangs over Canadian copper exports. At the end of July, the US president issued an “action” memorandum that used the usual arguments about impacts on US national security to indicate a sweeping tariff plan on copper imports. The presidential memo noted that copper was the second most widely used material by the Department of Defence and “plays a central role in the broader United States industrial base.”

So far, only semi-finished copper products and intensive copper derivative products have been subjected to US tariffs—at 50 percent. This applies mostly to copper pipes and wiring. Copper ore has been spared, for now. But the president’s memo calls for a continued monitoring of imports of copper and copper derivates. Here’s the Damocles sword: “the Secretary (of Commerce) shall inform the President of any circumstances that, in the Secretary’s opinion, might indicate the need for further action by the President under section 232 (national security threats).”

The Carney government’s initial fast-track bet on copper mines begs a whole set of larger, unaddressed, issues. How will it follow up to embrace opportunities for support of the entire spectrum of priority critical minerals? Cherry-picking one critical mineral is not a good strategy. To what extent can expanded production of copper be absorbed into Canadian manufacturing? Can new trade corridors, northward facing, be built and with sufficient speed?

Above all, can Canadian exports of copper be radically diversified away from reliance on a US market, and what would that look like? A bigger China market would have to be explored, with all the geopolitical complexities that entails. Trade with Japan and South Korea would have to be expanded. Canada would have to make the case as a responsible supplier of copper to world markets, especially in the “Global South,” to supplant ore from the DRC. We would have to become more competitive vis-à-vis Chile and Peru.

It all adds up to a brutal assignment for Canadian economic diplomacy. Let’s hope for a clear, longer-term vision to accompany the rose-tinted announcements. Announcements are easy; building a copper and broader critical minerals strategy that outlasts the headlines and is adjusted to the real world is the test.

Adapted from “Go Big on Copper? (not pennies)” by Wesley Wark (Substack). Reprinted with permission of the author.