Canadian Army to “Flood the Zone” with Drones, Commander Says
When I began reporting on the Canadian military’s halting embrace of drone technology for The Walrus, one conversation impressed me. Lieutenant General Michael Wright spoke with a candour and urgency I don’t usually encounter in covering defence and intelligence. Appointed commander of the Canadian Army in 2024, Lieutenant General Wright has been a central voice on how the country’s military must modernize to remain credible. In our exchange, which occurred in June, he made a powerful case for drones as fundamental to that rebuild. There was a clarity to his proposals that felt too important to bury inside a longer piece: it deserved to appear on its own terms. What follows is that conversation, lightly edited for clarity and length.
To start at the top, what has the war in Ukraine taught us?
It has reinforced a few key tenets. First, land and power matter. The war has dragged on for more than three years because neither side has been able to assemble the critical mass—of troops, precision, and firepower—for a breakthrough. But also, technology matters. And adaptation matters. And here I am talking about drones, for which we’re seeing an incredibly rapid tempo of innovation. I’ve heard, anecdotally, there is a maximum of four months before the technology is iterated. As the other side learns about how you use camouflage and concealment, how you ensure you’re not being constantly surveilled, or how you use electronic warfare to try to take down drones—every time an advance happens or countermeasure is put in place, the enemy quickly does what it can to counter it.
How is the Canadian Army learning these lessons?
We maintain Operation Unifier, where we train Ukrainian recruits and officers. That’s been going on since 2015. After the invasion in 2022, we moved it to Latvia, Poland, and the United Kingdom. We’re able to hear directly from Ukrainians about what they’re learning on the battlefield, and I’d say that, increasingly over the past three years, our soldiers are picking up as much from them as we’re providing to them. Now, we do have a Lessons Learned Centre, where we collect and analyze battlefield insights. But we need to, frankly, accelerate how we gather those lessons and, then, how we transmit them across the army so that they impact our doctrine—the way we fight, the way we operate, but also our investments in equipment and technology.
You’re referring to drones?
Yes, specifically Unmanned Aerial Systems, or UAS—and, of course, counter UAS. Offensive capabilities and defensive. They are a great example of why we pay so much attention not only to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine but to what our closest allies are doing around the world. It’s very much informing the Canadian Army’s modernization. As I’ve said elsewhere, the army we have is not the army we need. We’re working hard to get the capabilities we knew we needed years ago but also to stay flexible enough to bring in the capabilities we didn’t know we’d need—capabilities we’re learning about from Ukraine and elsewhere—and get them to our soldiers fast.
Can you just say something about what is currently available to soldiers in Canada for UAS systems and counter-UAS systems, and what you think you need in the future?
Yes, there’s a gap between the systems we have and what the moment calls for. We also have to speed up the ways we procure those systems. Right now, we have multiple standing offers out for small drones. Basically, general-purpose UAS. These are not the drones that, were we to get into a conflict, we would necessarily deploy with. But what I want is to flood the zone. I want to flood our forces with drones to give soldiers hands-on experience and get them comfortable both with operating them but also to help them understand what it feels like to be operating under near-constant surveillance. From Ukraine, we see that a lot of innovation comes from the bottom up. So, I want to get as many drones out across the army as possible. I want soldiers to become familiar with the technology and, more important, its potential. I want them to start thinking, “Okay, how would I employ this?” But also, “How does it change how I go out on a patrol, knowing this is technology adversaries have as well?”
Would that mean getting them in the hands of Canadian Rangers?
Yes, absolutely. With the increased number of activities that will be happening in the Arctic, we’re going to have to better integrate drones into our operations there. It’s a great example of how we’ve got experts who know the terrain, know the conditions of the environment, and can help us determine, “Hey, what are the right type of drones that operate better in remote territories or in the Arctic?”
Does “flood the zone” represent a significant shift in the slow, complex way military equipment is usually acquired? Is it a bit risky?
I’d say it’s different, but I think it’s more risky if we don’t get drones into the hands of our soldiers. We’ve got smart soldiers, and so they’re looking at what’s happening in Ukraine, and they’re saying, “I would not feel comfortable right now deploying into a situation like that where we don’t have drones.”
And I gather Latvia has been useful here.
Latvia has been an accelerant. Last year, the army issued a number of what’s called unforecasted operational requirements, or UORs. These are for needs that happen outside planned budgets or timelines. UORs allow us, in theory, to more rapidly purchase equipment and get it fielded. I mean equipment like loitering munitions—or armed drones—and soldier portable UAS systems which have the ability to jam drones. All this is specifically for Latvia, but what I’ve been focused on for the past year is to ensure that we eventually get that same equipment for the rest of the Canadian Army. While UORs can get equipment into the theatre more rapidly, it doesn’t work that way for units based in Canada. So, it’s important to find a way to get the systems we’re employing operationally in Latvia into Canada for the soldiers to train with. We really need to show our troops that, yep, we are investing in what you need to do your job, whether it’s uniforms, personal protective equipment, rifles—or, in this case, drones.
My next question is prompted by reading some of the media accounts of how the Ukrainian armed forces are adapting, down to smaller and smaller unit structures, to incorporate drone capabilities. Are you kind of thinking along the same lines for the Canadian Army?
We are, but it’s actually bigger than that, because we’re doing a first-principles review of our structure across the entire army, regular reserve, Canadian Rangers, and even our defence team civilians. So, what I can say, with some certainty, is the way that we are structured right now is not the way that we’re going to be structured in the future. And what we have to figure out is how to ensure the people who need the drones, or the counter-drone technology, are equipped with them. Reconnaissance soldiers who are out in front. You probably want them to have drones. Infantry soldiers on the main battle line with arms and tanks. Good for them to have drones as well. But we’re also thinking about resupply and rear-area security. I think the best way to answer this is: it’s hard to think of an organization on the modern battlefield that doesn’t need drones. And so, what we’re looking at—as we start to get more drones in and use them to determine what the future structure of the army will be—is how exactly are we going to do it? Whether it’s concentrated in specific units or distributed throughout the army, what’s absolutely clear in my mind is drones need to be integrated into every part of what we do.
Are land forces so specialized that you have to go down your own path with regard to drones and counter-drone systems? Or are there ways in which you can co-operate as the air force and navy also develop their capabilities?
At this point, I’d say there’s not that big of a difference. Yes, the army looks at army things, the air force looks at air force things, and the navy looks at navy things. But the first small drones that we were able to acquire for the army, we purchased with the navy, because they were looking to buy drones for their naval boarding parties—you know, sailors that they send on to the rigid hull inflatable boats to go do boardings of ships to inspect or seize them. What they were looking for was very similar to what we were looking for. So, we were able to get some economy of effort there. Latvia is another place we co-operate. The counter UAS that we delivered there is being fielded across both the air force and the navy as well.
Is it your sense that the Canadian Army might be able to draw on existing or future Canadian industrial capabilities to help with its drone and counter-drone systems?
The answer, I believe, is yes. But again, this is where the army sets the requirements, and it’s then up to the assistant deputy minister and Public Services and Procurement Canada to find the industry partners—regardless of which country they’re from. We put out a request, companies respond with what they can provide, and that process helps ensure the army isn’t showing any favouritism. It’s really those other organizations that determine which proposals meet the high-level mandatory requirements the army has set. But we’ve heard loud and clear from the prime minister about his “Buy Canadian” intentions moving forward, and this is where whatever comes out of the new Defence Investment Agency will be interesting.
I know some of the systems that we’ve acquired so far—the Reapers and the Teal 2 drones—all come from American manufacturers. And they are obviously good systems. With the air force and NORAD, we talk about the importance of interoperability. Does a similar kind of calculation happen with the drone systems you have—that you have to make sure they’re interoperable with certain allies?
Interoperability? Absolutely, and there’s no greater example than the mission at Latvia, because we are working with so many different countries over there. But what we talk about with a lot of our projects—maybe not as much for drones, or not yet—is interchangeability. Interoperability is making sure that our system talks to theirs. Interchangeability means that if we’re firing off a weapon, and it goes down, we can actually go over to the country right beside us—not the actual country, but their brigade—and have a commonality of equipment or parts to keep the fight going.
Do you think about top-level ways to explain to Canadians how important drones and counter-drone systems are for the army and its future?
I’m actually going to suggest we don’t need to explain that to them, and I’ll tell you why. On Father’s Day, I phoned my father-in-law and got an earful about, “Hey, why doesn’t the Canadian Army have drones? Why don’t you have enough drones? What are you doing about getting those drones?” So, while I think, absolutely, it’s important to educate as much as possible, drones are now so prevalent that I actually think it’s a little bit pushing on an open door.
Do you have a sense that young people will be much more attracted to a military career because they feel that it sort of fits their world of technologically inspired change?
Like I said, Canadians, writ large, are used to drones. I think the young Canadians who are joining the Canadian Armed Forces are expecting that we’re going to outfit them with the modern technology that’s required. We’re just finalizing a document that’s going to go across the Canadian Armed Forces, called Inflection Point 2025. It basically makes the case for why we need to change urgently. And one of the lines we have in there is we need to equip Canadian Army soldiers with the technology of their generation.
The post Canadian Army to “Flood the Zone” with Drones, Commander Says first appeared on The Walrus.
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