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How Alberta’s Separatist Movement Could Shake North America
Canada has seen its share of separatist sentiment, particularly from Quebec. In recent months, however, a separatist movement in the province of Alberta has been gaining momentum. Long-held grievances in the province are bubbling to the surface, just as President Donald Trump has been musing about Canada becoming the fifty-first state.
Below is a Q&A briefing put together by Christopher Hernandez-Roy, deputy director and senior fellow in the Americas Program, and Randy Boissonnault, former federal cabinet minister and member of Parliament. Together, they explain the roots of Alberta separatism, the political forces driving its resurgence, and the risks it could pose to Canada—and North America.
What is Alberta separatism, and why is it resurging now?
Unlike the more well-known Quebec separatism, which is rooted in a sense of a separate nationality, culture, and language, Alberta separatism has historically been a minor political movement rooted in Western Canadian alienation, a catch-all term for the perception that Alberta’s economic interests and political values are marginalized by federal institutions dominated by Central Canada. Given a perfect storm of factors, Alberta separatism is back in full force, claiming headlines and dividing the province and Canada into competing political camps.
The movement has evolved through three distinct historical phases. The first emerged following the 1980 National Energy Program, which attempted to mitigate the rising price of oil across the country and imposed price controls and new taxes on Alberta’s oil industry. The policy transferred approximately $100 billion—or approximately $218 billion (US) in today’s dollars—from Alberta to the rest of Canada between 1980 and 1985, triggering an economic collapse and creating decades of resentment.
The second phase manifested through the Reform Party in the 1990s, which channelled Western alienation into federal politics under the slogan “The West Wants In.” Despite electing enough seats to serve as Canada’s official opposition in Parliament from 1997 to 2000 and eventually merging with the Progressive Conservative Party to become today’s Conservative Party of Canada, the Reform Party did not deliver on the populist agenda that propelled them into office, leaving Western alienation sentiment to simmer.
The current resurgence represents a third, more potent phase. It is led by the Alberta Prosperity Project (APP), which is oriented around holding a referendum on the question of Albertan independence. The project seeks to hold a vote on the question, “Do you agree that the province of Alberta should cease to be a part of Canada to become an independent state?”
Contemporary separatist sentiment is bolstered by perceived federal hostility toward Alberta’s energy sector under former prime minister Justin Trudeau and “woke” liberals in Ottawa, Toronto, and Montreal. The federal government’s reaction to the Ottawa Freedom Convoy, which was a large protest in early 2022 in which truck drivers and supporters drove to Ottawa to oppose Canadian COVID-19 vaccine mandates and other pandemic restrictions, further fuelled separatist sentiment.
The movement is also benefiting from cross-border political influences, particularly conservative populism imported from the United States, which includes economic nationalism, resource development, and skepticism toward climate policies. Alberta separatism draws support from mostly rural, white, middle-aged men, often identifying with traditional values. It is grounded more in hard Conservative Party politics than in nationalism, and the separatists’ world views are rooted in a sense of status loss and mistrust of government institutions and elites. This mirrors some patterns observed in the US MAGA movement.
What threat does Alberta separatism pose to Canada?
Alberta separatism poses both immediate and structural threats to Canadian unity, even if outright independence remains unlikely. The most significant immediate threat is political and economic destabilization during a period when Canada faces contentious trade negotiations with the United States and internal economic pressures.
For the first time in the separatist movement’s history, Alberta has a provincial government willing to facilitate a separation referendum. Alberta premier Danielle Smith’s government lowered the threshold of signatures needed to consider a citizen-led referendum and removed provisions that previously prevented certification of unconstitutional referendum questions. These legislative changes enabled the APP to proceed with signature collection after their initial petition was ruled unconstitutional by a judge and extended their deadline to collect signatures.
On February 19, Premier Smith delivered a televised address outlining Alberta’s grievances with Ottawa. The centerpiece of the address was an announcement of a provincial referendum encompassing nine questions: four constitutional and five nonconstitutional, ranging from expanded provincial powers to the primacy of Alberta law over federal statute. Notably, and in what likely reflects sustained pressure from the business community, caucus colleagues, and the broader Alberta public, Premier Smith did not include a question on outright separation. Meanwhile, the APP continues its campaign toward the threshold required to trigger a citizen-initiated referendum question. Should that threshold be reached, the premier and her majority government will face a defining choice.
Even if a referendum fails to achieve majority support, significant minority backing could inflict lasting damage. Recent polling suggests separatist sentiment is prevalent in approximately 28 percent of Albertans, but of those, only 55 percent are “committed,” with another 25 percent “conditional,” while 20 percent are “symbolic,” using the independence threat primarily to express frustration rather than genuine intent to leave. The “committed” separatist number in the province is about 16 percent, very close to the number of Albertans who support joining the United States, though the latter number dates from early 2025 and may have changed since then. If the number of committed voters reaches the mid-30–40 percent range, it could signal deep fractures within Canadian federalism. Such a result would embolden separatist forces, complicate federal–provincial relations, and could invite more intervention from foreign entities, near and far, that seek to weaken Canada.
Alberta has the highest gross domestic product per capita of any Canadian province, due to its substantial oil reserves and critical minerals. A separation referendum—even an unsuccessful one—would create economic uncertainty that could deter private investment. The recent memorandum of understanding between the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta to strengthen energy collaboration and build a stronger, more competitive, and more sustainable economy, intended, in part, to address Western alienation, requires billions in private capital, which becomes considerably less likely if investors perceive political instability.
The referendum process itself poses risks. Foreign interference through social media could manipulate public sentiment, particularly given the movement’s reliance on digital mobilization. The provincial electoral authority and the Provincial Security and Intelligence Office lack the resources to address this threat: “There is no capacity whatsoever to push back against . . . misinformation and disinformation that’s going to happen,” according to Patrick Lennox, a former director of intelligence with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Furthermore, an independent Alberta would likely prove unsustainable as a landlocked nation surrounded by Canada and the United States. It would face strong challenges from First Nations who feel separation would infringe on their treaty rights; they have already approved a unanimous no-confidence vote in the Alberta government. The gravitational pull toward US annexation, potentially as the fifty-first state or an unincorporated territory such as Puerto Rico, would be considerable, particularly given US interest in Alberta’s energy resources. It could also provide renewed impetus for another Quebec separatism referendum, promised by the province’s Parti Québécois, which is narrowly leading in the polls ahead of a provincial election that must be held no later than October 5, 2026.
Separation movements in Canada are not new. What has the US posture traditionally been toward them?
During the Province of Quebec’s two separation referenda, in 1980 and 1995, the United States remained officially neutral, but was quietly in favour of Canadian unity. The Jimmy Carter administration emphasized that the referendum was an internal Canadian matter and that the United States would respect the democratic process and the outcome, whatever it might be. This was deliberate, as the administration wanted to avoid feeding Quebec nationalist narratives that framed sovereignty as resistance to pressure from English-speaking peoples or external domination.
Behind the scenes, however, US policy makers were clearly aligned in favour of Canadian territorial integrity. President Carter viewed a united Canada as in the US strategic interest, given that Quebec independence, it was thought, would introduce significant uncertainty into North American politics, trade, and defence co-operation, especially the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). They were also concerned that the process of ironing-out an actual divorce between Canada and Quebec would have been messy and lengthy, fuelling instability north of the border.
For his part, President Bill Clinton likely shared these concerns and, in 1995, used a state visit to Ottawa to subtly oppose Quebec separatism, saying he preferred a united Canada. In an address to the Canadian Parliament, he said the country’s model of cultural co-operation offered lessons to the world, though he insisted the decision ultimately belonged to Canadians. His remarks were welcomed by Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien but drew displeasure from the separatist Bloc Québécois party. Records released years later from President Clinton’s Presidential Library show that the administration was not prepared to immediately recognize an independent Quebec nor to automatically include it in the North American Free Trade Agreement, as it was a question filled with “complicated legal issues.” Despite Clinton’s preference for a united Canada, US policy with regard to separatism in Canada was officially neutral—a decision for Canadians to make without interference from south of the border.
Why would a divided Canada be bad for the United States?
A Canada divided into two, three, or more parts would have significant short- and long-term negative consequences for the United States in the defence, security, and economic spheres. If Alberta, Quebec, or both separated from Canada, NORAD could face severe disruption.
Dissolution would fracture aerospace warning and control into multiple sovereign jurisdictions, complicating intercept ability and authority and slowing crisis response. Intelligence sharing and security clearances could become more complicated. NORAD modernization and basing agreements might stall amid political disputes, and responses to threats would be hampered by new sovereign entities that would emerge without any meaningful military capabilities. It is likely that a fractured Canada would not be able to follow through with a number of defence system acquisitions needed for continental defence and North Atlantic Treaty Organization commitments, such as the F-35 contract and the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, among other systems.
In the worst case, gaps in the Eastern and Western approaches to North America could emerge, forcing the United States to assume greater unilateral responsibility, the opposite of the Trump administration’s policy of increasing burden sharing by allies.
Canada has struggled to meet its NATO defence-spending commitments, and the need to duplicate new civilian and military bureaucracies in the newly separated territories—which are currently federal responsibilities (defence, foreign policy, currency, postal service, international trade, workforce development, border management, and immigration, and some level of agriculture, environment, and public health responsibilities)—would make reaching the new 5 percent NATO targets very unlikely. Fragmentation would disrupt procurement and reduce deployable air and naval capacity; even if all entities remained politically pro-NATO, readiness, interoperability, and what’s left of the Canadian Confederation’s ability to sustain forward deployments would decline.
Dissolution would also mean that North American public safety coordination would become more complex and slower. Federal-to-federal integration between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security would fragment into multiple bilateral arrangements.
Intelligence sharing within Five Eyes could become uneven, particularly if new states adopted different legal or privacy frameworks. Extradition, border enforcement, and emergency response agreements would require renegotiation. Even if relations remained friendly, the need for coordination over multiple jurisdictions would increase transaction costs, slow crisis response, and create temporary vulnerabilities exploitable by organized crime or malign actors.
Alberta separatism would inject further uncertainty into an already uncertain future for North American trade. The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement applies to sovereign states, not provinces, so an independent Alberta would not automatically be covered by the agreement, itself in the process of being renegotiated ahead of the mandated July 1, 2026, review. Renegotiating market access, rules of origin, and dispute mechanisms would create investment hesitation across energy, agriculture, and manufacturing supply chains. Even temporary customs or regulatory divergence could raise transaction costs and disrupt integrated production networks spanning the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Given Alberta’s central role in continental energy exports, instability could also affect energy pricing and infrastructure planning, weakening regional competitiveness during a sensitive trade review period.
How has the Trump administration approached Alberta separatism?
From the Canadian viewpoint, the question of how the administration views Alberta separatism must be understood through the lens of President Trump’s recurrent rhetoric about making Canada the fifty-first state, with a recent poll showing that nearly half of Canadians believe that the United States would “definitely” try to economically and politically pressure Alberta to join as a new US state. The president’s comments about Canada, however, have had the effect of uniting Canadians, and any comments about Alberta separatism may have the same effect.
On January 29, 2026, the Financial Times confirmed that representatives of the Trump administration had multiple meetings with Albertan separatist leaders. Discussions reportedly involved scenarios where the United States might offer loan guarantees against Alberta’s natural resources or facilitate currency conversion from Canadian to US dollars. Such encouragement from the United States, if true, would represent a dramatic reversal from previous US opposition to Quebec separatism. The Canadian broadcaster, CTV News, was told by a senior US state department official in early February that “the department regularly meets with civil society groups,” and that “as is typical in routine meetings such as these, no commitments were made.” The state department added that there would be no further meetings.
Yet, on January 23, US treasury secretary Scott Bessent told populist podcaster Jack Posobiec that Alberta would be “a natural partner for the US” He further stated that “They have great resources. The Albertans are very independent people. Rumor [has it] that they may have a referendum on whether they want to stay in Canada or not.” Reacting to the news, Prime Minister Mark Carney said that “We expect the US administration to respect Canadian sovereignty,” adding that talk about separatist movements in Alberta or Quebec has not come up in his conversations with President Trump. Premier Smith made similar comments, adding that Alberta’s democratic process should be left to Albertans and to Canadians.
How would support for separatism impact the United States’ global standing?
US encouragement or facilitation of Canadian fragmentation would establish a catastrophic precedent for global order. If the United States is seen as actively destabilizing its closest ally and most stable neighbour, it fundamentally undermines US credibility to oppose Chinese or Russian influence operations elsewhere. Allies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America would further question whether Washington can be trusted to support their territorial integrity and political stability.
Perhaps most fundamentally, recent polling showed that nearly 80 percent of Canadians oppose Alberta leaving the country. This means that most Canadians across all provinces, including most Albertans, support national unity. US actions that facilitate or encourage Alberta separation would therefore align the United States against the clearly expressed preferences of the Canadian people, including most Albertans themselves. This would poison the bilateral relationship for generations whether or not separation was successful.
Instead, the Trump administration should live up to the aspiration of friendship with Canada expressed by President Trump in the Oval Office and leave decisions about the future of Canada to Canadians.
Reprinted, with permission, from the The Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The post How Alberta’s Separatist Movement Could Shake North America first appeared on The Walrus.





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