The F-35 Isn’t Just a Fighter Jet. It’s a Pledge of Allegiance

The stakes are high in what will be one of the most expensive and consequential defence purchases in Canadian history, as the Canadian government reviews its decision to purchase the United States F-35 fighter jet and has a second look at its competitor, the Swedish JAS Gripen.

All kinds of issues are at play—military capabilities, obviously, but also trade and security relationships with the contending countries of manufacture and the economic benefits that would accrue to Canada from the purchase. Anti-American sentiment, stimulated by US president Donald Trump’s annexationist threats, by the conduct of economic warfare through sectoral tariffs against Canada, and by the increasing sense of the US as an unreliable ally, also impacts on the decision. At the same time, we are viewing the Nordics, including Sweden, as key partners, especially when it comes to Arctic security.

Hard strategic calculations, economic concerns vital to convincing the Canadian public, pressure campaigns, motivated leaks, and strong tides of political emotion are shaping the moment too.

One other NATO ally, also with a history of close defence cooperation with the US, found itself in a very similar dilemma when trying to choose between the F-35 and the Saab Gripen. That country was Norway, and the history of its decision, dating back to 2008, is deeply instructive. Norway also beckons for a different reason.

The Norwegian decision, like ours, was surrounded by intense political controversy, strong campaigns by both aircraft companies (Lockheed-Martin and Saab) and from both governments, anti-US sentiment on the socialist/labour flank of Norwegian politics, and efforts to measure the relative economic benefit to Norway.

The decision ultimately went in favour of purchasing the F-35. The Norwegian public was told the decision was made purely on technical aircraft capability grounds. The detailed Norwegian analysis that favoured the F-35 was never released in public.

The Canadian government has promised to make public the outcome of its review of the fighter jet purchase, but how much of the actual decision-making calculus we will see is anybody’s guess, and there are bound to be significant limits to the public release to protect military secrets. What we are getting, instead, is a drip-drip of partial leaks to the media, clearly part of a public influence campaign on the part of anonymous players.

But what the Norwegian public got was a leak of a very different nature and magnitude. They were treated to a reveal, a look behind the secret curtain of US government advocacy for the F-35. This was all thanks to the mass Wikileaks/Julian Assange release of US diplomatic cables (dubbed “Cablegate”) in 2010–2011.

One such diplomatic cable, sent by the US ambassador in Oslo, on September 22, 2008, argued that the Norwegian government decision had entered a critical phase, that public perception was shifting against the F-35, and that high-level US government advocacy was needed. The US ambassador was concerned that any Norwegian decision to buy the Saab Gripen could have a domino effect on pending decisions on fighter jet acquisition by other European countries, such as the Netherlands and Denmark, and could have very negative consequences for bilateral relations—political, economic, and military—between the US and Norway. Sound familiar?

Another revealing cable from Oslo, one that came in the aftermath of the Norwegian decision to choose the F-35 in November 2008, tried to chronicle the decision and offer some lessons for the US. It mentioned a series of visits by US officials in the fall of 2008 “to make the public case on why the F-35 is an excellent choice, and the private case on why the choice of aircraft will have an impact on the bilateral relationship.” The embassy noted that the Norwegian government decision in favour of the F-35 was accompanied by “unusually strong language (for domestic political reasons) to say the Gripen was uncompetitive.” In a “very relaxed meeting” between the US ambassador and the Norwegian deputy defence minister, the Norwegian official was noted as saying it would be “very helpful” if the US government publicly stressed the strength of the F-35 and confirmed “there was no [US government] political pressure to buy the plane.” That’s an odd ask unless you know the opposite was true.

The ambassador’s cable stressed that the eventual success of the US campaign to sell the F-35 to Norway reflected the technical capabilities of the plane “despite perceived weaknesses in other areas such as the industrial [benefits] package” and followed consistent and sustained US public and private advocacy. He noted that the US campaign tried to walk a careful line, at least in public pronouncements, between outright pressure on Norway and more diplomatically couched reminders to the Norwegian government of the potential impact of the decision on the bilateral relationship. The ambassador noted that the private advocacy campaign was “much more forceful” than the public one, presumably meaning more iron fist and less velvet glove.

Is Canada on the verge of committing to its fighter jet future the way Norway has? Will some combination of the alleged technical superiority of the F-35 over the Saab Gripen for various classified military scenarios, combined with both a public and behind-the-scenes US pressure campaign, bend the decision in favour of going through with the full purchase of eighty-eight F-35 jets (thirty-six more than were bought by Norway)?

Canada may not follow the Norway way, but the circumstances are remarkably similar. We just can’t expect a Canadian “cablegate” to take us behind the scenes. We get, instead, unabashed pressure and threats from the very public US ambassador to Ottawa, Pete Hoekstra, who has warned about the dire consequences for the NORAD continental defence arrangement, and for Canadian trade with the US, should the government abandon the F-35 purchase

What Norway never considered was the possibility of buying a combination of both the F-35 and the Saab Gripen, often referred to as a “mixed” fleet. Why not? The reason is straightforward. Norway’s military needs are distinctly different, and much less complex, than those that face Canada. They operate in one well-defined, regional geographic theatre, against one identified foe on their doorstep: Russia. The Norwegian air force mission is simpler than that of Canada and can be met with one jet fighter.

A mixed fighter jet fleet may be a Canadian strategic necessity in a way it never was for the Norwegians.

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There is no question that operating such a mixed fleet would be a complex endeavour that would put a strain on pilot supply, maintenance capabilities, infrastructure and basing, and supply chains. Yes, Canada has done it before but in an age of much less sophisticated, simpler jet fighters. Also, in an age when we had more air force pilots, bases, and ground crew. At one point, during the 1960s, the Canadian air force included three different fighter jets, the CF-100 (1952–1981), the CF-104 (1961–1986) and the CF-5 (1968–1995), and we managed, coming up with the pilots and the maintenance crews to keep the planes in the air. Incidentally, all three jets were manufactured in Canada.

But is there a path to a responsible mixed fighter fleet in the decades ahead? A former Royal Canadian Air Force commander, Yves Blondin, believes there is. He thinks Canada should go ahead with the full purchase of the F-35—despite his concerns around US control of software upgrades, weapons, and sensor systems for the planes—but layer in a subsequent purchase in the mid-2030s of a second, European fighter jet like the Saab Gripen.

He makes this argument by balancing NORAD air defence needs with a “credible expeditionary capability in Europe.” It’s a beguiling option (although a full F-35 fleet plus an additional complement of expeditionary aircraft would present a very significant, maybe bank-breaking, expenditure).

Cost issues apart, the big problem with the Blondin vision of a mixed fleet is that it scrambles the options. If Canada wanted to create a distinctive air expeditionary force to operate in Europe with NATO, the best plane for that purpose would be the F-35, which is already or soon to be operated by key NATO allies. The Saab Gripen, on the other hand, is well suited, arguably better suited than the F-35, to fulfill an air defence and air surveillance/sovereignty assertion mission in Canada. Faster, longer range, more serviceable, cheaper, more operationally deployable, and more reliable in northern airspace, and with a much better industrial benefit package for Canada. Also, it carries all the lethality and sensor capabilities needed.

Buy the Saab Gripen in sufficient numbers to fulfill Canada’s air defence needs. Buy the F-35 in sufficient numbers to make a credible expeditionary arm for NATO. Let the experts decide what those numbers should be and how to layer them in on a timetable as we retire the long-serving CF-18 (“Hornets”). Forget US arguments that Canada must fly the same plane as the US for NORAD purposes. We don’t now and never really have (not since the Korean war). As writer Peter Jones has argued in this space, arguments about interoperability concerns lack all credibility.

Part of the challenge of maintaining a mixed fleet could be solved by permanently basing and operating Canadian F-35s overseas, as an expeditionary air arm, with a NATO ally. A mixed fleet would be sorted into two fleets—one overseas, one operating at home. We have a long history of such forward basing during the Cold War, notably with the stationing of Canadian CF-104s (“Starfighters”) in Germany.

In present circumstances, there are plenty of available European matches, but Norway would be an excellent candidate. They are the first country to complete the full acquisition of their F-35 fleet, all fifty-two of which are now available to the Norwegian air force. They have nearly a decade of experience with the plane. They have available space at Norwegian air bases, with hardened shelters, for a Canadian contingent. Maintenance and infrastructure costs, training and exercising, could be shared. Norway, I am told, would welcome a Canadian contingent. It would make a significant contribution to a sought-after Nordic security partnership and to NATO. Win-win.

Meanwhile, if the Saab offer to build an assembly capacity in Canada is forthcoming, go for it. The industrial benefits package from the F-35 is paltry (as the Norwegians discovered). Building the Saab Gripen in Canada would not be the Avro Arrow redux but something much more tried, true, realistic, and needed. It’s a plane well suited to a Canadian air defence, deterrence, and sovereignty protection mission, and it would mean to return to a lost capability to manufacture advanced fighter jets in Canada.

Adapted from “The F-35 decision: Canada getting pregnant in the Norway way?” by Wesley Wark (Substack). Reprinted with permission of the author.