Yeehaw, Alberta Is Getting a Pipeline (at BC’s Cost)

Last week, Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government and Alberta premier Danielle Smith did something many thought politically impossible: they agreed to a new oil pipeline cutting to the British Columbia coast, designed to move bitumen to foreign markets.

Their memorandum of understanding (or MOU, a non-binding blueprint for where both governments want to go) lays out the high-stakes deal: Ottawa signals a willingness to ease up on key climate rules and even revisit the BC tanker moratorium. In return, Alberta promises tougher carbon pricing for heavy industry and a major expansion in carbon capture projects—emerging technology meant to trap emissions from oil sands operations and bury them underground—alongside a privately financed pipeline with Indigenous co-ownership.

BC wasn’t brought into the room, and it shows. The province is furious, warning that the MOU weakens coastal protections, heightens spill risk, and resurrects a fight many thought was finally behind us. Several First Nations and environmental groups have already come out swinging.

To get past the talking points, I spoke with Stewart Prest, a political scientist at the University of British Columbia, about what’s actually inside the agreement—and what it might unleash.

What’s the national interest argument here? Why is Carney doing this now?

I think he sees a need to bridge the gap between Canada, its mainstream political movements, and the more populist right-of-centre political movements, which are very much centred on Alberta and the energy sector. That’s not the only issue that they care about, but it’s clearly one of the primary drivers: grievances around Alberta’s ability to access foreign markets with its energy production. I think Carney sees this as a kind of grand bargain, an opportunity to bring together these two sides, which are so divided. It is really the primary line of polarization, the fault line within Canadian politics right now.

What’s the national interest risk here? Why is this a bad idea?

There are real risks with this strategy. Should it fail, it will provide fresh grievance to that populist group and become just another argument for why the two sides can never work together. And if it does fail, part of the reason will be because the agreement has so far been struck without the involvement of either the province of BC or Indigenous communities along the route of the proposed pipeline. Some of those communities are perhaps in favour of taking on an ownership stake and co-operating, but others, concerned about long-term risk to these ecologically sensitive areas, are ardently against the project. That potentially runs afoul of the government’s constitutional obligation to consult with Indigenous groups in good faith.

Other risks?

The other downside for Carney is that, while he may have neutralized some of his opposition by looking like a Conservative prime minister, he is in danger of losing important components of his own coalition. The resignation of Steven Guilbeault, a former climate minister, from Carney’s cabinet is an indicator that those who joined the Liberals under Justin Trudeau because they thought the government was acting in good faith on the environment no longer hold that view. Having voters conclude that a vote for the Liberals is effectively no different on these key issues than a vote for the Conservatives is about the only thing that can bring new life into either the New Democratic Party or the Greens; both of them look pretty morbid right now. And you don’t need to have many voters switching back to one of these other progressive parties for the Conservatives to pop up into minority or even majority territory.

Is there a scenario where Carney wins for losing? What I mean is, even if the pipeline fails, can he still benefit politically?

I think neutralizing Smith, for however long this peace between the two sides lasts, will be to Carney’s political advantage. It clearly puts opposition leader Pierre Poilievre in a very difficult situation. He is left criticizing the deal and its contents, which essentially puts him opposite of Smith and the Alberta firmament in the oil patch. The energy sector really likes this deal. Everything we’re hearing is that it’s Christmas come early for that sector. So, opposing it, for Poilievre, is unpalatable.

But then what’s his other alternative? To say Carney did a good job, and this is an effort that deserves the support of Conservatives across the country? I literally don’t know if he’s capable of saying that. Even after the election, where he was clearly humbled by the result, it was like pulling teeth for him to talk about supporting the government. I don’t know that that’s his default setting. I don’t even know if he possesses that setting. And so, over the short term, this clearly will work to Carney’s political advantage in the Conservative-versus-Liberal divide.

Is this actually an opportunity for BC? Could it demand concessions?

They could try, but they have a pretty weak hand. The project is going ahead, full stop. So, it’s either join the parade or get out of the way. Also, the federal government is already providing whatever support it can to several major economic development projects in BC, so effectively Carney can say, “You’re already getting your part of the deal. We just expect you to play along here.”

Is this a risk, ultimately, to Canadian unity?

The wording on the MOU says between Canada and Alberta—not the government of Canada and the government of Alberta. It is a remarkable elevation of Alberta to the kind of champion of this so-called “other” voice in the country. Essentially, the MOU is saying that there’s a new version of two nations in Canada, and it is mainstream politics versus its more populist counterpart. Alberta is the face of that populist politics. And BC is now a second-class citizen in the federation. The agreement happens between Alberta and Canada, and everyone else has to find their place—and that includes BC and First Nations. More to the point, Carney has moved the federal government from a position of arbiter, regulator, and convener of the federation to an actor picking sides.

Is there nothing BC can do to stop it?

Its options are limited. Because this is a pipeline that traverses provincial boundaries, the federal government is the regulatory actor, constitutionally speaking. Welcome to the majesty and the mystery of our shaggy federation. If it were a pipeline just going through BC, then BC is the regulatory actor, but because it crosses a provincial boundary, the federal government is the regulator. Moreover, the federal government, given our highly centralized legislative structure, means that if the prime minister wants to go in a particular direction, as long as they have the confidence of the House, they can do it. So, the cabinet has considerable leeway here, and they’re exercising it.

But what specific options does BC have?

It can lodge a constitutional objection that the federal government isn’t doing its due diligence with regard to protection of the environment or in acting as a supporter for First Nations, who themselves can say the federal government is paying lip service to the idea of consultation. I actually think the MOU’s language opens the federal government up to this legal challenge. The agreement gives the appearance of a done deal, leaving everyone else to fall in line, which is not the idea of good-faith consultation. My sense is coastal First Nations will be less concerned about the economic opportunities of an ownership stake in a pipeline and more concerned about long-term risk to ecologically sensitive areas. There’s a reason why a tanker ban exists on that coast.

I think I know the answer already, but it would be good to have you say it. How would a pipeline square with our climate targets?

Not well? That’s the short answer. There are environmental commitments as part of the MOU, but they tend to be very much in the future and relatively fuzzier. It’s a further step away from a very concrete kind of activity like a price on carbon or a cap on industrial emissions today. We are moving away from that model, towards a future where we meet our targets using carbon capture technology that, in many ways, is still improving. Magical thinking is a strong term, but there is a certain amount of hopefulness to the mechanisms by which the country is planning to get to its commitments. This is very much in keeping with the way in which we used to approach environmental politics. It’s actually something of a Stephen Harper–era tactic. We would say, yes, we’re absolutely going to do that. We don’t know how we’re going to get there, but we’ll worry about that later.

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Will they build the pipeline?

That’s almost the wrong question. The mindset matters more. If you take seriously the idea that the world is gradually, haltingly, but still assuredly moving towards a lower carbon future, the MOU means we will continue to invest significant resources in an older technology—one that ties our economy much more closely to the production and export of bitumen, and to the carbon-based world more broadly. Maybe not now, maybe not in twenty years, but at some point in the future, we will have invested in a technology no longer marketable in a meaningful way. Clearly, there is still an appetite for oil, but we also see the intensity of emissions dropping around the planet, and we see a real move towards renewable resources and electric vehicles in places like China. Even amid the churn and upheaval of the Trump era, the transition is happening. We’ve just decided not to pay any attention to it.

How does it square with Carney’s image as someone who cares about the environment?

It’s a fascinating question. We see a real division in immediate reactions. The first camp puts a lot of stock in Carney’s reputation, not only as someone committed to the environment but as a really smart guy who has a plan and is going to pull off his objectives. He hasn’t abandoned them, goes the thinking. He just has a clever way to achieve them that perhaps we don’t totally understand yet. And the other side is saying that, given the threats to national unity and to the Canadian economy, Carney has put all that in abeyance to take care of first things first. We need to meet the needs of the moment and tend to less urgent issues at a later date. The problem with that strategy, of course, is that a later date never comes and we only keep dealing with the urgency of the moment.

It does seem to confirm all the worst fears about Carney’s commitment to First Nations consultation. This is like Exhibit A of what everyone was afraid was going to happen.

I think the agreement with Alberta takes us much closer to that point people were worried about. We now have a body of evidence to suggest that, ultimately, when there is a choice between stewardship of the environment or investment in profitable industry, when there’s a choice between a commitment to working with Indigenous peoples as partners or trying to get a profitable project through—whatever the cost—that Carney will pick profit.

That impression will lock in unless there’s a moment where this government really sits down with Indigenous communities who are opposed to the project, and really shows that it is willing to listen to what the communities are saying with an open mind. That means either being open to the possibility the project in its current conception can’t go ahead because of the concerns being raised—or, failing that, being open to the possibility that the concerns are real and require considerable thinking about how to do it in a way that is sensitive to an environmental area set aside by BC.

I’m assuming you mean the Great Bear Rainforest?

Yes. Likely the pipeline terminus will be located somewhere in that region. GBR has been declared an environmental preserve. The rules governing it are complicated, but over the past decade, the province has been committed to protecting that coastline precisely because of resource development accelerating elsewhere across BC. That those considerations are being thrown out the window as soon as it becomes economically and politically expedient—and to do it without even asking BC—is a pretty clear indicator people are right to be concerned about Carney.

Are we looking at an even angrier and more divided country than before?

Carney is trying to find a way to make common cause with a disgruntled part of the country. But he’s doing so in a way that will make other parts of Canada feel completely overlooked, and it’s not even clear that this strategy, over the long term, will actually satisfy the demands of those disgruntled groups. It’s not even clear that it is possible to satisfy a kind of maximalist position within the energy sector, or—never mind the energy sector—the voters within Alberta, who are committed to a more populist style of politics. Their skepticism might just run too deep. And so, as soon as there’s a setback at any point along the way, this whole agreement can fall apart, and essentially you’ll have a fresh round of grievances and, now, newly alienated parts of the country as well. There is, of course, a possibility that everyone gets used to the new normal. In my view, it’s more likely this is setting up the federation for a contentious future in which it starts to turn on itself.

Is Carney responding to the threat of American aggression by adopting a strategy that could divide us more effectively than any external force?

He’s going to put the federation under unprecedented new pressures. It’s a different approach to deal making. Normally, when a decision affects multiple provinces, those provinces are at the table, represented either by the first minister or a senior cabinet minister, discussing things as a group. The discussions tend to be focused on finding a way for everyone to get on side. If discussions break down, a decision is taken. The courts are often the court of last resort, where those who lost the debate will have their day to oppose the decision and, failing that, live with the result. But there is a good-faith attempt to bring everyone together. When BC and Alberta quarrelled over previous pipelines, the federal government tried to remain a neutral and honest broker.

And that’s not the case here.

Here we see a federal government deciding with another province what will happen in a third province without that third province being at the table. That’s just a fundamentally different way to approach federal decision making, and it’s a precedent that has the potential to be explosive. Imagine the reaction if the federal government sat down with Ontario to plan out a pipeline running through Quebec? The blowback would be extraordinary—and for good reason. It would show a lack of respect for the limited but still real sovereignty that provinces have within the federation. They have jurisdiction for a reason: to represent the interests of their community. Respecting that, even if there isn’t a constitutional requirement for it, is part of the job of keeping that federation together—this very diverse and contested patchwork of interests we call a country, a country that seems to beat the odds in surviving and thriving in the way it does. But Carney’s ploy of openly choosing sides—I don’t think anyone has ever tried that before. It could work out; people could grumble and get used to it. Then again, it might not. I side with not.