How Canada Is Being Pulled into America’s War on “Narco-Terrorists”

The United States has killed more than 150 people in airstrikes across the Caribbean and eastern Pacific as part of Operation Southern Spear, the so-called counter-narco-terrorism campaign run by the US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

The Donald Trump administration has insisted their actions are lawful and in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict, with justification centred around “the United States’ inherent right of self-defence as a matter of international law.” The occupants targeted in the operation have been designated as “narco-terrorists” or members of “designated terrorist organizations,” as a justification for blowing them out of the water—except, to date, no evidence or intelligence to back up those claims has been presented by the US to the public.

The international community, legal experts, members of Congress, and the United Nations have said the strikes are “illegal extrajudicial killings,” as the US military is not allowed to deliberately target civilians—even if they are suspected of criminal activity—who don’t pose an immediate or imminent threat of violence to America.

Prior to Operation Southern Spear’s commencement in September 2025, US law enforcement agencies would intercept and arrest suspected drug smugglers, sometimes with Canada’s help. Now the US military is executing them—and Canada may again be implicated.

When Trump readied the 11th Airborne Division out of Alaska for potential deployment to Minneapolis to help Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other federal agents in their immigration crackdown, I posted the big scoop: the operations leader for that unit was none other than Canadian Brigadier-General Robert McBride. I subsequently wrote about the intertwined nature of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the US military for The Economist.

The ties detailed involved exchanges, secondments, embeds, task forces, and other joint operations, including training. At any time, there are hundreds of our service members sprinkled across the vast US military, with several more in NORAD or overseas serving with NATO, CENTCOM, and others.

That story rattled both Ottawa and Washington. The Department of National Defence was keen to separate themselves from the idea of a Canadian military member partaking in the brutality visited upon civilians in Minneapolis. They assured the public that there are safeguards in place to prevent a Canadian being “deployed” with an American unit, including that any such actions would have to be approved at the highest levels (but it does happen: see my previous coverage about the Iraq invasion).

But the DND was extremely skittish when it came to answering questions about intelligence sharing between Canada and the US and potential CAF involvement in Operation Southern Spear. Weeks of plugging away at sources in the US military, CAF, Ottawa, Washington, and the Open Source community brought me to the tipping point.

Here’s what I found out: by nature of our military relationship with the US, Canada is implicated in Operation Southern Spear. The question is to what degree.

Despite DND “working on” the questions I sent in on February 18, a high-level former military member confirmed there are Canadians serving in SOUTHCOM, which is running Operation Southern Spear, and in a “detection and monitoring” hub known as Joint Integrated Task Force South (JIATF South) in Key West, Florida.

What positions and clearances they hold are not public. What is known is that intelligence (by this I mean information, logistics, maps, targets, criminal and operational intelligence collected and analyzed for this operation) does flow from JIATF South and SOUTHCOM to the US military units and assets tasked with carrying out the airstrikes.

Somewhere in that mix are Canadians doing their jobs.

This past November, the United Kingdom suspended intelligence sharing with the US about suspected drug-trafficking boats due to concerns about the legality of Operation Southern Spear and to protect themselves from being complicit.

I asked Ottawa if we did the same. Perhaps they reassigned personnel to prevent them from potentially being implicated? Or revised protocols? Or “war gamed” these scenarios to protect our national interests and service members?

If so, why not tell the public to reassure us? No answer.

Sources spoke of the normal precautions in place when it comes to CAF members working within foreign militaries. There’s a “no foreign” rule as a norm (a.k.a. ushering out non-US staff from any room or meeting that would discuss any active action), but there was no guarantee that information wouldn’t “bleed” or be circulated outside the room. People talk.

All of which raised a question: Did Canada have advance knowledge that the US was planning to airstrike boats? No answer.

Even if the “no foreign” rule was enforced, it was suggested to me that it’s not possible to say definitively that there is no Canadian involvement in the operation, even inadvertently. Who’s to say that reports, analysis, or intelligence gathered, created, or originating from a Canadian working in SOUTHCOM, JIATF South, or elsewhere aren’t passed on to those who go on to kill people in airstrikes?

If you’re asking yourself “Is that legal?” we’re about to get into a tricky bit of legalese—a grey miasma of plausible deniability.

If any intelligence in regards to the operation originated from a Canadian federal agency, and there was a risk that giving said information to another country could result in “substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity,” then the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act kicks in. ACMFEA is the 2019 law that prevents federal agencies from sharing or using information with foreign entities if there’s a substantial risk of torture or mistreatment.

According to Wesley Wark, senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, it’s “doubtful” that there would be any Canadian-originated intelligence relevant to Operation Southern Spear that would be shared with the US. “We don’t collect intelligence on US targets and would have nothing to share. Our foreign intelligence collection efforts are largely, though not exclusively, focused on the work of CSE [Communications Security Establishment Canada], and CSE is subject to Canadian foreign intelligence priorities (which are public).”

ACMFEA does not cover individuals, so CAF members working within the US military are exempt from its provisions. And while there are mechanisms for Canadian personnel to defy orders they feel are illegal, immoral, or against Canadian values, bi-national chains of command can get complicated. No one likes stepping out of line, even if the authority in question is a foreign military.

There is also the “originator control rule,” which means that US intelligence belongs to the US, even if shared with Canada. Canadians working in the US military who are involved with Operation Southern Spear would technically be working within legal guidelines—given the Trump administration has given itself carte blanche to blast people out of the water—by the skin of their teeth.

“I am not overly concerned,” said Retired Vice-Admiral Mark Norman, former vice chief of defence. “There are checks and balances, and the CAF take this seriously.” Norman said he had reached out to former colleagues when Operation Southern Spear kicked off because of our close relationship with the US military and was told “things have been addressed.”

“Americans have a vested interest in making sure Canadians are not implicated . . . the likelihood is remote, but it would be more reassuring if DND was more transparent and forthcoming,” he said.

Which brings us to Operation Caribbe.

Operation Caribbe is the Canadian contribution to the American-led “enhanced counter-narcotics” in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean—the same playground as Operation Southern Spear. We send ships and aircraft on rotation to patrol the waters and assist the US in intercepting drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other crimes.

The joint operation has been running since 2006. In 2010, the US and Canada signed a memorandum of understanding that allows the US Coast Guard (USCG) to operate from Canadian warships. In an email, the USCG describes a tightly integrated arrangement. The broader mission is coordinated by US Southern Command’s Joint Interagency Task Force South.

In practice, Royal Canadian Navy vessels locate and track suspect ships, while embarked USCG Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs) carry the legal authority to act—conducting “boardings and seizures” under Title 14 of the US Code in international waters. The USCG calls the arrangement “highly effective.”

When it comes to arrests, custody of evidence (seized drugs), and suspects, LEDETs take custody of both, despite operating from a foreign vessel. “The law enforcement phase of the mission is a US operation. The suspects are typically transferred to a US Coast Guard cutter or another US asset at sea, from there they are transferred to the United States for prosecution,” the email continued.

The USCG deferred to JIATF South for my questions regarding intelligence sharing as it pertains to Operation Caribbe. They have not replied. I also asked the DND why it sent the HMCS Yellowknife on a seven-week stint for Operation Caribbe despite the optics of having our military involved in an operation so close to Operation Southern Spear—in the same stretches of water where deadly airstrikes have killed dozens. No answer.

Had Ottawa revised any protocols regarding suspects apprehended while on Operation Caribbe due to concerns about potential mistreatment by US law enforcement? No answer.

On February 28, 2026, the US and Israel launched an attack on Iran. Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed, along with several other high-ranking officials.

At least 153 people were killed in a strike on a school, “demolishing its concrete building and killing dozens of seven to 12-year-old girls,” according to a visual investigation by The Guardian’s Tess McClure and Deepa Parent.

Iran has blamed the US and Israel for the strike on the school. The Americans have said they are looking into it, while the Israelis stated they were not aware of Israel Defense Forces operations in the region.

Retaliatory strikes by Iran have hit countries hosting US bases—Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. US-allied Oman and Saudi Arabia too.

Iran has also attacked shipping routes and civilian sites like Dubai hotels and the US embassy in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Six US servicemen have been killed and eighteen injured in action as of Monday, according to CENTCOM.

A former senior Canadian general told the CBC’s Murray Brewster that “it’s highly likely some Canadian military members, on exchange with the United States, would have been involved at some level in the planning and co-ordination of air strikes on Iran.”

The DND denies this but did not answer specific questions from Brewster on how service members would have been exempted.

Lloyd Axworthy, Canada’s foreign minister from 1996 to 2000, warned in the Toronto Star on March 3 that Canada’s role in US-led military operations is often more direct than it appears. “Canadian officers sit inside American headquarters that plan and execute wars. Our ships, planes, and sensors feed systems that find, track, and fix targets. On paper we are ‘supporting,’ ‘monitoring,’ ‘co-operating.’ In practice, we are part of the machinery of force,” Axworthy wrote.

He underlined that the details and protocols for Canadians who serve in foreign militaries are “tucked away in classified annexes and memoranda of understanding that no ordinary citizen will ever see,” and that our prime minister has executive discretion but can couch their actions behind the fact that there is no formal deployment motion tabled.

“You cannot embed Canadian officers in US war-fighting headquarters, plug Canadian intelligence into targeting processes, then wash your hands when missiles fly. If Canadian personnel helped plan, analyze, or enable an operation, Canada is implicated—whether or not a Canadian finger was on the trigger,” he said.

When it comes to Operation Southern Spear, the legal loopholes Ottawa hides behind may not be enough to conceal its role in the lethal strikes.

• Is Canada Helping Identify Boats the US Is Blowing Up?
• This Is What American Fascism Looks Like
• Why Regime Change by Force Is Unlikely to Work in Iran

Concerns over complicity became clear when, sixteen days after my initial email to the DND, Ottawa finally replied to one of my questions regarding the likely involvement of CAF personnel in Operation Southern Spear.

In fact, what they chose to answer says much about the tension those who govern our country must be feeling. In an uncharacteristically long email sent on Friday, March 6, the department insisted that the CAF “is not sharing intelligence with the United States for the purposes of supporting” Operation Southern Spear. At the same time, it noted that the CAF continues to pass on information with US partners “as allowed by Canadian law and authorities,” under existing arrangements tied to other counter-narcotics missions, which officials say will be “caveated” to keep it from Operation Southern Spear.

What that tells me is that Ottawa knew it could be implicated in Southern Spear due to the close relationship between our militaries. Officials also seemed appear aware of the optics: a Canadian warship on Operation Caribbe while Southern Spear unfolds in the same waters. Information safeguards—or caveats—were thus put in place.

A source told me such caveats, typically an explicit condition that limits who can access information, are “meant to be treated with high seriousness.” They also tend to work both ways: if CAF information cannot flow to Southern Spear, US intelligence from that operation should not flow back to Canadians.

But the government did not volunteer any of this publicly. It took repeated prodding simply to confirm there was an issue. More troubling is what their reply did not address.

None of my questions about CAF personnel working within SOUTHCOM or the JIATF Force South were answered. How can Ottawa prevent crossover between Southern Spear, Canadian personnel embedded with the US military, and Operation Caribbe? Is compartmentalization at that scale even possible? Were personnel reassigned? Did Ottawa know in advance the US planned to begin lethal strikes?

If these risks were anticipated, why not say so openly?

Fear. Ottawa fears further strain in the Canada–US relationship. The promise to caveat intelligence sounds straightforward, but SOUTHCOM is the command-and-control framework that oversees both Southern Spear and Operation Martillo, the broader mission that includes Canada’s Operation Caribbe. They all occupy the same geographic space and draw on the same intelligence feeds. So while legally and operationally distinct on paper, the potential for overlap under such a system is high—known as “mission creep.”

Meanwhile, US operations in the region continue to expand. This past Tuesday, American forces began working with Ecuador against groups the US now designates as terrorist organizations. According to The Intercept, US special operations forces are assisting Ecuadorian units in raids on cartel facilities, though it remains unclear whether that assistance involves combat or support roles such as intelligence and logistics.

Sound familiar?

The question is how far Ottawa will allow Canada to be pulled into US military operations that seem to grow by the day.

Adapted from “Blood in the water: Canadians implicated in Op. Southern Spear” and “Exclusive: Ottawa admits restricting intelligence over Op. Southern Spear concerns” by Christy Somos (Substack). Reprinted with permission of the author.