Bluster, tariffs, and a quiet retreat: Why Trump made a U-turn on Greenland

WASHINGTON, D.C. — Since early January 2026 — fresh off his Venezuela operation — U.S. President Donald Trump escalated demands for American ownership of Greenland, threatening a U.S. invasion of the Danish territory and 10 per cent tariffs on NATO allies unless they backed him.

Nordic and other European troops were moved to Greenland as a result, and many had begun to imagine thousands of U.S. soldiers invading the island that Trump claims is key to world security. But then, at Davos on Wednesday, Trump made a U-turn. 

“We probably won’t get anything unless I decide to use excessive strength and force, where we would be, frankly, unstoppable, but I won’t do that,” Trump told those gathered at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland. 

“I don’t want to use force. I won’t use force.”

European leaders breathed a sigh of relief, stock markets rallied, and Denmark welcomed the de-escalation. Hours later, after meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte at Davos, Trump then announced a “framework for a future deal” on Greenland that would involve the U.S. and NATO enhancing Arctic security — and notably not affecting Denmark’s sovereignty.

But a framework for allied cooperation on Arctic security has been in place for decades, making this simply an elegant way of backing down on untenable bluffs. Analysts say Trump had no legal authority to impose the tariffs he threatened, and invading would have weakened NATO and Arctic defence, rather than strengthening it.

Last weekend, Trump threatened a 10 per cent tariff on products from Denmark, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, taking effect on Feb. 1. If the allies didn’t comply with his demand to purchase Greenland by June 1, he said the duties would rise to 25 per cent.

When asked which legislation the president could use to impose such levies, Inu Manak, senior fellow for international trade at the Council on Foreign Relations, made it clear she thought it was an empty threat. 

“I can’t think of any trade statute that would allow that to happen,” she explained. 

Instead, said Manak, Trump was likely relying on the flexibility of the tariffs he’s imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act — the fentanyl and reciprocal tariffs he’s imposed over the past year — to punish the Europeans.

Trouble is, that authority is expected to be snatched away by the U.S. Supreme Court, which fast-tracked the case involving IEEPA’s use to impose tariffs and will soon rule on their legality. 

Trump was likely putting his hopes on continuing to use IEEPA, Manak said, in the hopes that “it gives so much flexibility to the president to act on national security grounds that he can use it to raise tariffs on anything.”

Trade watchers are eagerly awaiting the court’s ruling, and most believe the tariffs will be deemed illegal, but many still wonder how broad the ruling will be. 

“Are they going to say IEEPA doesn’t allow these tariffs?” she asks. “Or are they going to say that IEEPA doesn’t allow any tariffs?”

In other words, the justices may leave room for IEEPA to be invoked for other types of tariffs. 

Using something like Section 232, from the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, said Manak, wouldn’t work, as that statute only applies where importation poses a national security threat and is used for targeting specific products.

So, unless the Supreme Court rubberstamps Trump’s use of IEEPA for tariffs — which experts say is highly unlikely — the president’s tariff threats over Greenland would’ve gone nowhere anyway.

Even if the Supreme Court rules in Trump’s favour or issues a narrow ruling, leaving some wiggle room, the president’s continued use of tariffs as coercive weapons will depend, said Manak, on the extent of their economic costs on the United States. While many companies frontloaded stock early last year as a way of buffering the impact of tariffs, those stocks are running low, and prices are rising.

“Trump already created some space to lower tariffs last year, particularly on food products and grocery items,” she said, noting “he is aware that there is an economic impact that’s negative.” 

The other possible mitigating factor is Congress, as House Republican leaders’ ban on tariff-repeal votes expires at the end of the month, paving the way for Democrats and Republican moderates to force a vote ahead of the midterms.

Last summer, Manak noted, many Republicans got a lot of flak in town halls for supporting Trump’s tariffs, and those leaders likely want a chance to go on the record to oppose them. And if the Democrats can flip the House, regaining its leadership, they would also be in a stronger position to oppose the duties. 

But Trump’s tariffs weren’t the only untenable bluff in his Greenland gambit; his Arctic security rationale drew sharp criticism from defence analysts.

Trump argued that owning Greenland was key to Arctic security, owing to threats posed by both China and Russia, but security analysts disagreed. 

“This notion that [the Arctic is] surrounded by Russian and Chinese ships is a preposterous figment of his imagination,” said Whitney Lackenbauer, research chair of the study of the Canadian North at Trent University. 

Such rhetoric, he said, makes it look like Russia is going to invade the Canadian Arctic, he said. “They’ve got more than enough oil and gas in their own Arctic.”

The main military threat, he explained, is through the Arctic, not an invasion of it.

Connor McPartland, assistant director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, explained that Russia poses the biggest near-term challenge with the potential to launch ballistic or hypersonic missiles over the North Pole — and toward the United States or Canada. He also noted the presence of Russia’s strategic submarines near the Kola Peninsula.

China’s activity in the region, meanwhile, is growing with dual-use research expeditions, joint Russian patrols, and energy partnerships, but any Chinese threat is a longer-term concern, he said.

The problem for Canada, Lackenbauer and McPartland acknowledged, is that the Arctic has been strategically neglected by the West for decades. 

“We’re in a bit of a precarious situation where we do have to make investments in Arctic defence,” said Lackenbauer, “both for national and collective North American reasons.”

“But we have to be really careful that we’re not legitimizing American narratives that are not reflective of the real security environment that we face.”

Canada identified what was needed for Arctic security years ago – in its 2017 “Strong, Secured, Engaged” policy — from NORAD (sensor and infrastructure) modernization and new subs to over‑the‑horizon radar, satellite upgrades, and F-35s. 

A contract is in place with Australia for the radar, but as for the rest, said Rob Huebert, politics professor at the University of Calgary and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “we’ve only started to get really serious about it after 2022 [with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine], and here we are in 2026,” he said, pointing to little progress.

Canada is awaiting a government decision on whether to indeed procure the F-35s, as initially planned, or the Swedish Gripen. The military has strongly recommended sticking with the F-35, the U.S. model, but experts say any decision would mark progress.

As a result of making little progress on the 2017 plans, “we’ve left ourselves vulnerable to a very irrational actor,” Huebert said, referring to Trump.

But an invasion of Greenland wouldn’t improve Arctic security, it would have the opposite effect, he added.

Invading a NATO country would either blow up or devastatingly weaken the NATO alliance, especially as Russia develops stealthier systems that could evade detection.

It would also send a signal to both Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin that “as long as we leave his interests alone in the Western hemisphere, we can take actions against Taiwan, Poland, the Balkans.”

“What happens if the Americans truly only meant that the spheres of influence pertain to them, and they turn around and suddenly see China attacking Taiwan and say, ‘Oh, you can’t do that.’?” he said.

“That’s how wars actually do start by accident.”

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