Why Regime Change by Force Is Unlikely to Work in Iran

As one of Canada’s last chargé d’affaires in Iran, Dennis Horak watched the Islamic republic from the inside during his three-year tenure from 2009 until just before Canada closed its embassy in 2012. Now retired, his service also included Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. That experience takes on new relevance after the latest military attacks on the regime by the United States and Israel.

Missing from much of the debate over the past few days is a clear-eyed understanding of how Iran sees itself: its history, its insecurities, and the logic that governs its nuclear program and responses to force. With the escalation reviving familiar questions about the risks of miscalculation, I reached out to Horak on Sunday for a seasoned diplomatic perspective on what this moment means.

You were pretty much the last Canadian diplomat in Iran, part of a period you described as dangerous for your team—so much so that you recommended closing the embassy in 2012 based on a deteriorating security environment.

I actually handed the note to the Iranians telling them it was time for us to leave. They weren’t happy.

Okay, so here we are, fourteen years later, with an attack by US and Israeli forces on the country. Saturday morning, Israeli jets struck and killed Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and multiple top leaders. What is going through your mind right now? Are you shocked? Surprised? Did you have a sense that this was coming from your channels?

I think we all saw something was likely to happen, given the amount of assets the US had moved into the region. Initially, part of it was to enhance US leverage in negotiations with Iran, but the gap between what the US wanted and what the Iranians were willing to give was just far too wide. I was surprised by the timing. There had been indications that positive vibes were coming out of the meetings. We had heard, on Friday, from Oman’s foreign affairs minister, who was brokering the talks, that a peace deal was within reach. So, I was a bit struck when I woke up yesterday to find this had all kicked off but not overly surprised it eventually happened.

It seems this is partly about regime change, with US president Donald Trump openly urging Iranians to take over their government.

I don’t know what that would look like. We’ve seen attempts at regime change by remote control in the past—Libya being the classic example—and that didn’t work out very well. The Iranian regime is a resilient institution. They have long planned for the death of Ayatollah Khamenei because he’s eighty-six years old and has been in ill health for a long time. So, I think they have a succession plan in place. Whether those people they were hoping to step in are still alive is another story, but I think they will certainly make efforts to ensure continuity of leadership in some respects. I don’t think Iran is as fragile a regime as it may seem from the outside or it may seem for those wishing for regime change.

You mentioned the gap between what Iran was willing to give up and what the US wanted. How do you understand that gap?

The Iranians believe international law gives them the right to enrich uranium. The Americans contest that. It’s been a key challenge from the very beginning of these negotiations, going back to the President Barack Obama years. The original nuclear agreement negotiated under Obama—the one Trump tore up—capped it at tightly controlled levels, with inspections to ensure it. This time, the talks again stalled on the same point. The Iranians were unwilling to give up enrichment, claiming they need it to run a civilian nuclear program for things like electricity and medical research. Nor were they willing to import enriched uranium. They’ve seen what happens when you rely on imports for some key need: you can be cut off by sanctions. For Tehran, it’s matter of self-reliance. For the Washington, it became very much a red line.

Because enrichment is inseparable from a bomb?

That’s the fundamental issue. It was also reported Americans wanted restrictions on Iran’s missile program. But I don’t think Iran was ever going to give up that program either. It’s essentially their only deterrent. The deterrent has failed this time around, but it’s the only way they can respond and defend themselves. Whether that was the major sticking point or not, I don’t know. I think it came to enrichment. Iranians probably wanted some sort of restrictions similar to what they’d had, or some variation under the previous agreement. The Americans wanted zero and ultimately came the conclusion that they were running around in circles and Iran was never going to change.

Will this curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions? Is this where it finally starts thinking about a less confrontational posture toward the US?

You would think, at this point, facing an existential crisis, that whomever emerges out of Iran’s leadership—whoever survives this current conflict—will take a long, hard look at its positions on a series of issues, the nuclear front, their hostility toward the US, hostility toward Israel, their destabilizing activities in various countries, the building up of proxies. Why are they doing all of it? What has it gotten them? What’s been the benefit? The Iranian people want a normal life. They look across at Dubai, or other places rich in oil, and ask, “Why can’t we have that? Why do we have to suffer through this? For what purpose?” That’s part of what feeds the anger in the streets—the wasted opportunities and the sacrifices Iranians have to make over and over again because of sanctions.

Sounds like you’re leaning toward no.

I’m just not sure they have that in them—or, more specifically, that a certain generation of leadership does. They’re still animated by revolutionary ideals they carried out of 1979: anti-US, anti-Israel, fighting the imperialist fight. It may be the only story of survival they understand.

When you were posted in Iran, did you belong to the camp that believed the regime was days away from a bomb or was close to fielding missiles that could hit the US? Did you believe it actually had this capability?

Oh, they have it. I remember the Iranian president’s chief of staff saying to me, at one time, “Why is everybody bothering with these nuclear agreements? We have the knowledge; you can’t bomb that away.” And he was right. I mean, they have the technology. They have the ability to use it. They enriched to just below weapons grade. The next step is not that hard to take. They can build very advanced ballistic missiles. No question. It was always about the decision to do it or not. Back in the day, most observers were of the view they had not made that decision but wanted to keep the option open.

Why?

Tehran looks at North Korea and sees how it’s managed to avoid the kind of intervention we’re seeing now and concludes the reason is they have nuclear weapons. The reality is more complicated; having China as an ally helps enormously. But the lesson Iran takes is: keep the nuclear option alive. So, were they within days of exercising it? I don’t think so. But if they made the decision, could they? Yes.

How close do you think we are to a wider regional war?

It depends what you mean by a wider regional war. It’s not as if anyone is lining up to ally with Iran. Tehran has been a destabilizing force in the region for decades. Virtually every country around it has concerns about it, especially the Gulf states. When I was in Saudi Arabia, Iran was their primary concern. Even Russia and China have been quiet about the current attacks. Iran has started to hit civilian targets in the Gulf states—Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, possibly Qatar. It risks pulling in these places more directly, but I’m not sure that changes the strategic equation. As for Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, they’re so severely degraded, I’m not sure they would bring a lot to the table. The Houthis can be disruptive, but they’re more of a nuisance. So, it’s not clear to me that this conflict can expand much beyond what we’re already seeing.

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From your perspective, how are Western governments most likely to misread this moment?

It would be wrong to underestimate the risks of broader destabilization inside Iran. It’s a multi-ethnic country. They have a large Kurdish population, for example, and any sign the country might break apart would alarm the Turks. They wouldn’t tolerate a Kurdish mini-state emerging in northern Iran, especially one that could link up with the Kurds in Iraq. We should be prepared for how quickly something like that could unfold, often in ways we don’t see right now, post-attack, further down the line. A lot depends on how long the military operation lasts and what sort of anarchy starts to take hold inside the country, or if Iran starts to slide into a civil war, with Iraq-style factions competing for power. If that were to play out, it would make what occurred in Iraq look like a picnic.

Does Canada lose anything by not having a diplomatic presence in the country right now?

In a perfect world, we would still be there, with our own eyes and ears, and we would have a clearer sense of what’s actually happening on the ground. We talk to allies, sure, but that doesn’t replace first-hand understanding of how fragile the situation really is. The other thing is, when we were there, we were able to talk to our allies who weren’t—like the Israelis, like the Americans—and say, “You know what? Here’s actually what we see going on now.” The Brits are doing that. The Australians would be doing that. New Zealanders, probably, as well. So, that’s not lost to the world, but we had a different perspective on things, or our own perspective, and that’s what we miss.

There’s been a lot of talk about Prime Minister Mark Carney betraying his Davos speech by supporting the attacks. I’m curious about your thoughts on that.

I’ve seen this debate, and I disagree. In large part, the Davos principles were about pursuing our own interests, and that’s what we’re doing right now. There are two elements underscoring the approach Carney has taken. One is that our position on Iran and the concerns that we have long had on Iran’s nuclear behaviour, treatment of its own citizens, and its impact in the region. We’ve had those concerns for a long time, and they’re aligned very much with those in the US. Not that we were following the Americans. We came to those views on our own, independently. So, there’s an alignment of policy. And the Canadian government in the last couple of weeks has not been shy about talking about regime change, that to re-establish relations with Iran, we need a different kind of government. So, I wasn’t surprised, because our position on Iran has been very aligned.

And the second element?

The other factor is the bilateral aspect. On an issue like this, where we don’t fundamentally disagree with the overall policy, to be offside with the United States would not be in our interests.

If you were advising Ottawa today, what would you tell it to do?

To keep doing what we’re doing. Like I said, there’s a logic behind it, and there’s not a lot we can do to alter the course of things, even if we wanted to. We’re just not players in this.

You’re no longer in the diplomatic corps. Do you come out of a career like that with a sense of hope intact? Does spending time inside that system leave you feeling like some problems are simply too entrenched to fix?

I dealt with the Middle East, directly and indirectly, for about twenty-two of my thirty-one years in the service. After that kind of exposure, it’s hard not to become cynical about prospects for real change. And yet, I’ve also seen things I would have thought impossible. I was in Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, and when I returned as ambassador in 2015, the country felt fundamentally different. The shifts around women were particularly striking. Not just the right to drive, but their growing presence in the workforce. Also surprising was the curtailment of the religious police, and the broader downgrading of the religious establishment’s influence in daily life. For decades, these were the kinds of reforms everyone said would never come. And then, quietly, they did.

Saudi Arabia still has a long way to go, and there’s been backsliding on a lot of political issues. It’s a mixed bag. But it did open my eyes to the fact that sometimes change can happen.

Possibly for Iran too?

Logic would suggest that, after everything the country has endured, someone inside the system would finally say, “Enough; we need to change course.” If they were afraid to change before because of what it might unleash, you’re left to wonder if it could get any worse. I don’t know if Iran can make that kind of shift. But the fact that I even think about the question means, somewhere in the back of my head, I believe it’s possible.