Trump Says “A Whole Civilization Will Die.” Experts See a War Spinning Out of Control

It’s been over a month since we published our roundtable on the Iran war, and the situation has collapsed dramatically. What began as a campaign of decapitation strikes aimed at Iran’s leadership is unravelling into a messy, grinding, volatile, multi-front conflict with no clear end in sight. With President Donald Trump now warning that “a whole civilization will die” if Iran doesn’t make a deal, we decided to reconvene our panel of specialists and foreign policy analysts to reassess where things stand. What kind of war is this becoming? And what, at this point, does an endgame even look like?

Their responses follow, edited for length and clarity.

• Wes O’Donnell
• Maral Karimi
• Wesley Wark
• Vladyslav Lanovoy
• Greg Fyffe
• Jabeur Fathally
• Pierre Pahlavi
• Janice Gross Stein

“We’re collectively watching a US president trying to escape the consequences of his own impulses.” Wes O’Donnell US Army and Air Force Veteran, Global Security Analyst, TEDx Speaker, and Filmmaker

What makes this war unusual in the modern era is how much of the picture is being assembled from open-source intelligence. During the Global War on Terrorism, when I was in uniform, the Pentagon was far more forthcoming—or at least more practiced at feeding the press enough information to shape the story before the internet did it for them.

So, what can we piece together?

When the US military infiltrated Venezuela to extract President Nicolás Maduro, I warned that this relatively bloodless operation would embolden Trump; it would trick him into believing that every future military operation would go as smoothly.

The president fell head first into that trap. There was no real presidential case made for this war. No sustained argument to the public, no clear political objective, and no honest accounting of costs. He just lurched into it, betting that air power would give him a quick win before the public had time to ask why any of this was necessary. Now the Venezuela fantasy has evaporated. Five weeks in, he’s threatening civilian power infrastructure (a war crime, mind you) while testing ceasefire channels through intermediaries—which were just rejected by Iran.

We’re collectively watching a US president trying to escape the consequences of his own impulses.

From here, the military’s realistic options are bad, worse, and catastrophic. A sustained air campaign means deeper escalation with no terminal condition. A naval blockade risks losing multi-billion-dollar warships in one of the world’s most dangerous maritime corridors. A ground invasion of a country twice the size of Texas, with mountainous terrain and 90 million people, would make our losses in Iraq look like a Pilates warm-up.

If the world’s most advanced military is struggling to produce outcomes against a regional power with a mid-tier arsenal, imagine the strategic intelligence gift the US has just handed China, a nation with an exponentially larger military, a deep magazine, and a very patient timeline. As for Trump, the least humiliating exit is usually where bad wars finally admit that they always were.

“For the Iranian regime, pressure is read as existential threat, thus concession is not an option.” Maral Karimi Faculty Lecturer in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at Toronto Metropolitan University

The current trajectory of the conflict reflects a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The instability of US foreign policy is evident in the shifting objectives of this war, reflected in alternating, exaggerated claims to victory, premature declarations of “complete and total regime change,” and explicit threats of the total destruction of a nation, all in the absence of a clearly articulated political end.

In the absence of a stable endpoint, lack of strategic coherence is exposed. As such escalation is no longer bound to a clearly defined political outcome, yet it risks becoming the objective itself. By contrast, the Iranian regime operates with a comparatively fixed objective: survival. That objective is not abstract. It organizes how the regime interprets pressure and how it responds to it.

For the Iranian regime, pressure is read as existential threat, thus concession is not an option, unless it can extend its life. Despite the ideology, the Iranian regime is a highly pragmatic one, which is why it does not rule out negotiation, but any deal must be compatible with regime continuity, and current US terms do not meet that threshold. What we are witnessing is a persistent misalignment of objectives: what Washington treats as leverage, including pressure on choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, is read in Tehran as one of the few available means to prolong the conflict and avoid short-term collapse.

At the same time, external pressure, including strikes on critical infrastructure, is reorganizing the domestic landscape of resistance inside Iran. The Islamic Republic is not cohesive; it is marked by volatile social unrest and elite competition. But under heightened threat, these fractures are, at least temporarily, contained, contributing to the relative absence of large-scale street mobilization that external actors, primarily the United States and Israel, had anticipated. For many Iranians, the promise of “surgical strikes” as a pathway to regime collapse is giving way to a more sobering assessment: that such interventions may leave behind both a more violent state apparatus and a devastated economic, social, and physical landscape.

Finally, Washington’s rhetoric of “sending Iran back to the stone ages” or “a whole civilization will die tonight never to be brought back” does not simply signal resolve; it normalizes the scale of violence under consideration and erodes remaining constraints. The result is a conflict with no clear equilibrium: escalation becomes easier to initiate and harder to contain.

“Economically, the war in Iran has gone global.” Wesley Wark National Security Expert and Contributing Writer for The Walrus

Is the world at the beginning, the middle, or the end of the US-initiated war in Iran?

Addressing the nation on April 1, his first speech after a month of war, President Trump had his opportunity to spell out an endgame. He said that his “core strategic objectives”— crippling Iran’s military, crushing their ability to support terrorist proxies, and denying them the ability to build a nuclear bomb—“are nearing completion.” Trump also urged patience, a strange counterpoint. The Vietnam War lasted for over nineteen years, he reminded his audience. The Iran war was only thirty-two days long “against one of the most powerful countries.” But the US was “on the cusp of ending Iran’s sinister threat to America and the world.”

“On the cusp,” “nearing completion,” are unlikely to satisfy a doubtful American populace or anxious US allies, whatever remains of them. Delivering stats on the duration of the Vietnam War wasn’t a good look.

A White House press conference on April 6 only deepened the uncertainty. Trump is now pressing on an imminent deadline for Iran to comply with his demands, threatening to destroy every bridge and power plant in the country within four hours (he professed not to care about whether this was a war crime), then telling the world he doesn’t want to carry out such a plan because he is a good person and even suggesting the US might help Iran rebuild.

Amidst such scattershot ideas, an extended and unpredictable war now beckons. Israel has invaded south Lebanon, the Gulf States are under drone and missile strikes, the Houthis in Yemen have started to target Israel. There are indications of Russian intelligence and Chinese material support to Iran.

Economically, the war in Iran has gone global. Iran has taken up the weapon of economic warfare, effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz to the transit of oil and natural gas from “unfriendly” states. Oil price shocks and shortages around the world have been the result.

The question of the Strait of Hormuz has become central to a resolution of the war. Trump has urged other countries to deal with problem. They must “grab it [the strait] and cherish it,” he said. The message was for the US’ recalcitrant North Atlantic Treaty Organization partners, who are not going to heed it, as Trump well knows. The president has turned to trash-talking NATO as a paper tiger.

But the “grab it and cherish it” appeal might just sit well with the US’ “peer competitor,” China, which has a huge, vested interest in oil transit though the strait. Or maybe Trump was serious about the idea of the US collecting tolls for transit through the strait. Or maybe he has no plan. A spiralling, globalizing, out of control war is not one that ends soon, or even in the interests of its initiators, no matter what their military power.

“There has already been too much human suffering and physical damage in this conflict.” Vladyslav Lanovoy Neuberger-Jesin Professor of International Conflict Resolution, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa

The ongoing war in the Middle East is like a terrible cancer. As days go by, it affects an increasing number of countries and people in the region and beyond. The military strikes by Israel against Lebanon or by Yemen’s Houthis against Israel are just some of the most recent signs of how the conflict is spreading and taking new, dangerous, and unpredictable dimensions.

The bellicose tone adopted by the United States, Israel, and Iran, with none ready to stand down or compromise, indicates that the effects of this conflict will only grow in number and scale. Many are predictable and unsurprising, such as the continued rise in crude oil prices or Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Others are less obvious but are just as significant. In this brief contribution, I wish to highlight two issues that have received little attention in the mainstream daily news coverage of the conflict.

First, as a consequence of the ongoing conflict and “the largest oil supply disruption in history,” the United States authorized a thirty-day exemption for the sale of Russian oil, which was previously sanctioned, to curb the global oil price surge. It has done so despite protests from Ukraine and its European partners. This is a major setback for the rule of law and for the international community’s efforts to respond to Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2022. Less than two weeks later, on March 24, 2026, Russia struck Ukraine with over 900 drones in a single day, setting a record for such attacks since the start of a full-scale invasion in February 2022. Whether this is mere correlation or causation, the war in the Middle East is now fuelling the Russian aggression against Ukraine. With no end in sight to either conflict, this temporary exemption may soon become effectively permanent and seriously undermine ongoing peace efforts in Europe.

Second, several countries, including many longstanding US military allies and some members of NATO, have expressly denied US access to their military bases or overflight rights. These include Spain, France, Austria, Italy, and Switzerland. The United Kingdom has put its military bases at the US’ disposal to strike targets in the Strait of Hormuz but has caveated that this should only be done in the exercise of “collective self-defence of the region.” These developments are significant and show the resilience of international law and its ability to speak up to power.

Other nations know that they face serious legal risks when determining whether to place military bases at the disposal of the US and Israel or whether to aid or assist them in any other way and appear to have reacted accordingly. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 on the Definition of Aggression, a binding law, recognizes that “the action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State” constitutes an aggression.

Given the egregious nature of the multiple violations of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello on both sides of the conflict, countries also know that they face legal risks if they provide other, even less “serious,” forms of aid or assistance. They are also required to actively co-operate through lawful means to bring that situation to an end.

There has already been too much human suffering and physical damage in this conflict. Unfortunately, the international rule of law has, yet again, also become a target. It can only be saved if the rest of the world, unlike the belligerent US, upholds its obligations.

“The rejection of the normal conventions of diplomacy and war is ominous.” Greg Fyffe Executive Director of the Intelligence Assessment Staff in the Privy Council Office, 2000–2008

The US–Israel–Iran war has demonstrated the limits of US power. Bombing alone has not forced an Iranian surrender. A ground war, with its military and logistical obstacles, would be disastrous. The US president wants the war to end immediately, but his contradictory declarations on the path forward are increasingly deranged.

Iran rejects early peace negotiations. Instead, its goals for an agreement include the permanent elimination of the threat of attacks by the US and Israel, politically significant damage to the US economy, and compensation for the war’s devastation. The drop in US public support for the war and the approaching mid-term elections favour Iran’s objectives.

The Ukraine war demonstrated that the facilities producing and deploying drones can be hidden. While the US threatens devastating bombing, Iranian drones and missiles continue to attack US bases, Gulf allies, and Israel. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz and threatens to choke off the Red Sea at the Strait of Bad-al Mandeb.

US allies will be alarmed by the strategic limitations of the formidable US military. Restricted shipments of oil, fertilizer, chemicals, and helium for chips herald inflation and a global economic crisis. The repercussions could be long lasting, and recovery only partial, if compensation for war damage includes taxing ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz.

The rejection of the normal conventions of diplomacy and war is ominous. The US has legitimized sudden switches from peace negotiations to surprise attack and the targeted killing of a regime’s governing elite. These precedents may be used against the US in diplomatic discussions, future conflicts, or terrorist campaigns.

The Middle East crisis is heightened, not diminished. The tragedy of Lebanon continues. Just as the US becomes both isolationist and unpredictably aggressive, the capacities of the United Nations and NATO have been diminished. The question of how they will be renewed or replaced will become increasingly urgent.

“The American president’s behaviour cannot be explained by the madman theory.” Jabeur Fathally Professor in Comparative Law and International Humanitarian Law, University of Ottawa

A crime does not occur alone. This, in a way, sums up what has happened since the US–Israeli military aggression against Iran, dubbed Epic Fury.

For thirty-eight days, war crimes have been perpetrated: from the bombing of the South Pars gas field and fuel tanks in Tehran to the attacks on the Natanz, Furdo, and Bushehr nuclear sites, as well as universities, hospitals, and cultural sites, to name just a few. Yet, it bears repeating: the rules of international humanitarian law are clear. The principle of distinction requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilian populations and civilian property be protected from such attacks.

It is true that, in the past, these rules have not always been respected, but this is only armed conflict where political leaders, starting with the American president and his secretary of defense (of war), dare to declare, before the world’s cameras, that “Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. There will be nothing like it!” and that they are going to send one of the greatest civilizations “back to the Stone Age!”

This is unprecedented in the history of contemporary international law.

It’s understandable that these two officials, given their training and knowledge, might not know much about Cyrus the Great, Darius, Khayyam, Razhas, or Rûmi. But I wonder if their legal advisers haven’t whispered to them that genocide and the threat of genocide are prohibited and that attacks against dangerous facilities—with a clear specification of nuclear facilities—constitute serious violations of international law!

Paradoxically, the American president’s behaviour cannot be explained by either the madman theory or the economic benefits of war. Today, millions of Americans and non-Americans are seriously questioning the president’s mental capacity and the legality of the orders he gives to military officers and subordinates.

It’s worth remembering that, under international criminal law, obeying unlawful orders from a superior officer does not constitute a defence. In short, the thirty-eight days of Epic Fury represent American ethical and legal defeats—that could eventually be followed by a military defeat. This defeat will be manifested in an increasingly isolated United States government, even among its NATO allies, and in the protests of an American people who find themselves trapped in the games of a “President-King.”

In Canada, as in most Western countries, the Mark Carney government seems increasingly convinced that the only remedy for this Trumpian unpredictability lies in practising strategic patience—a concept dear to Iranian politicians—and no longer submitting to the president’s whims. Unfortunately, Mr. Trump’s unpredictability does not appear to be a temporary economic and political strategy but an expression of one man’s moods and narcissistic tendencies—a man, who, let us remember, possesses the nuclear launch codes of the world’s second-largest nuclear power.

“Where Washington must constantly weigh costs, Israel is more inclined to press its advantage.” Pierre Pahlavi Full Professor, Chair of the Department of Security and International Affairs, and Deputy Director in the Department of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto

What is often missed in current coverage is that the Islamic Republic is not fighting to win in the conventional sense—it is fighting to survive. As Henry Kissinger observed, some actors seek to “win by not losing.” That logic is central to Tehran’s posture today.

Facing what it perceives as an existential threat, the Iranian regime does not require battlefield superiority. It needs time, resilience, and the capacity to impose costs while avoiding decisive confrontation. Unlike its adversaries, it can offload much of the war’s human and economic burden onto its own population—an advantage authoritarian systems retain precisely because they are not accountable to their citizens.

This explains Iran’s continued reliance on indirect strategy. Rather than meeting force head-on, it circumvents the battlefield, targeting economic vulnerabilities: energy flows, maritime security, and financial stability. Disruption, not domination, is the objective.

The United States, by contrast, operates under a different—and more fragile—set of constraints. It cannot simply absorb costs over time; it must justify them. Economic strain and public fatigue are not peripheral factors but central vulnerabilities, and they are precisely what Tehran seeks to exploit. By prolonging the crisis and shifting pressure onto global markets, Iran tests Washington’s tolerance for sustained engagement as much as its military resolve.

As costs accumulate, the centre of gravity moves inward. Public opinion becomes a strategic variable, and electoral timelines impose limits on endurance. The White House must calibrate not only against an external adversary but against domestic impatience—an asymmetry that structurally advantages Tehran.

Western allies add to this constraint. Their support remains measured, often hesitant, reflecting both economic exposure and limited appetite for escalation. This uneven backing reinforces the perception of a coalition whose cohesion may fray under prolonged pressure.

Israel forms the third pole. Under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, it appears more prepared to sustain and intensify operations within the bounds of its capabilities. Driven by immediate security imperatives and supported by a comparatively resilient domestic consensus, it faces fewer short-term political constraints than its American partner. Where Washington must constantly weigh costs, Israel is more inclined to press its advantage.

What emerges is a deeply asymmetrical triangle: Iran leverages time and disruption, the United States navigates economic and political exposure, and Israel pursues operational momentum. The risk lies not only in escalation but in the way these uneven constraints interact—creating openings that each actor seeks to exploit, often at cross purposes.

“The war will likely sputter out, without any formal agreement. But the story is not yet finished.” Janice Gross Stein Founding Director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

We are at a point when the war stops or it escalates. Until now, the United States and Israel have scored tactical successes but failed to achieve strategic victory. Although neither their objectives nor their execution is identical, the tactical successes of both, compounded by failures in assessment, compromised the opportunity to achieve their strategic objectives.

Iran has seized strategic momentum through its control of the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States is left with no good choices. Trump could declare victory and walk away, leaving behind a radicalized Iranian regime with control, at least for now, of 20 percent of the world’s oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) and a new source of revenue. Or he could escalate in several different ways, but every option risks further damage to energy infrastructure throughout the Gulf.

The war will likely sputter out, without any formal agreement. But the story is not yet finished. Wars generally leave in their wake disruptive forces that build over time. The United States, Israel, the Gulf states, Iran, and those economies that continue to heavily depend on fossil fuels have all lost in different ways and will have little choice but to change in its aftermath.